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ABSTRACT 
Contactless / Near Field Communication (NFC) card payments 
are being introduced around the world, allowing customers to use 
a card to pay for small purchases by simply placing the card onto 
the Point of Sale terminal.  Although the terminal needs to be able 
to verify a PIN, it is not clear if such PIN verification features 
should be available on the NFC card itself. We show that 
contactless Visa payment cards have (largely redundant) 
functionality, Verify PIN, which makes them vulnerable to new 
forms of wireless attack. Based on careful examination of the 
Europay, MasterCard and Visa (EMV) protocol and experiments 
with the Visa fast Dynamic Data Authentication transaction 
protocol, we provide a set of building blocks for possible attacks. 
These building blocks are data skimming, Verify PIN and 
transaction relay, which we implement and experiment with.  
Based on these building blocks, we propose a number of realistic 
attacks, including a denial-of-service attack and a newly 
developed realistic PIN guessing attack. The conclusion of our 
work is that implementing Verify PIN functionality on NFC cards 
has no demonstrated benefits and opens up new avenues of attack. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.3 [Computer Systems Organization]: Special-Purpose and 
Application-Based Systems – Smartcards; K.4.4 [Computers and 
Society]: Electronic Commerce – Cybercash, digital cash, 
Payment schemes, Security; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: 
Public Policy Issues – Abuse and crime involving computers. 
General Terms 
Economics, Reliability, Experimentation, Security, Human 
Factors, Legal Aspects. 
Keywords 
Security attacks; NFC; EMV; Visa; fDDA; Chip & PIN; 
skimming; Verify PIN; relay; payments; credit card; debit card. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Contactless payments are designed to be a quick, convenient and 
safe card payment method that is an alternative to cash. Often 
referred to as Near Field Communication (NFC) payments, 
contactless payments are quicker than traditional Chip & PIN 
payments [12][13][14][15], as there is no PIN entry or signature 
required from the cardholder to authorize the payment. Since 
payment can be made simply by placing the card near to the Point 
of Sale (POS) terminal, it is possible to make a payment by 
placing the wallet containing the card on the POS, without taking 
the card out of the wallet. NFC also supports payments made by 
NFC enabled mobile phones such as Google Wallet [19] and 
Orange QuickTap [27]. 
Europay, MasterCard and Visa (EMV), commonly called Chip & 
PIN, is a global payments system deployed across Europe, Asia 
Pacific, Australia, Canada and Latin America, with a total of 1.5 
billion EMV cards and over 21 million EMV POS terminals 
worldwide [35]. This number stands to increase as Visa intends to 
introduce EMV to the United States [32]. 
The introduction of NFC payments has brought a fundamental 
change to the structure of the EMV protocols. The EMV Chip & 
PIN specifications comprise a single protocol which covers the 
operation of all EMV compliant cards and EMV compliant POS 
terminals. For NFC payments, in addition to the base specification 
[5][6][11], there are now four versions of the EMV protocol, each 
of which is specific to one of the major card issuers: JCB [7], 
MasterCard [8], Visa [9] and American Express [10]. This greatly 
increases the complexity of the EMV protocol standards which 
are composed of 700+ pages for EMV Chip & PIN and 1300+ 
pages for EMV NFC. The increase in complexity and the addition 
of issuer specific functionality will also increase the potential for 
anomalies and errors to be introduced. 
The implementation work presented in this paper shows that these 
anomalies translate into concrete security concerns in the 
operation of contactless Visa credit and debit cards: 
1. Visa NFC Cards Allow PIN Verification over NFC 
NFC enabled Visa cards issued by Barclays Bank1 will allow 
any NFC reader, such as mobile phones and USB readers for 
PCs, to access the Verify PIN functionality on the card. In 
one of the attack scenarios presented in this paper we show 
that criminals can use NFC to probe the card for its PIN 
number and collect the card details without the knowledge of 
the cardholder. This seriously compromises the security of 
the individual cardholder carrying a Chip & PIN as banks 
have traditionally blamed the customer for being careless 
with their PIN if a PIN number is entered on a fraudulent 
transaction. 
2. Relaying NFC Transactions using Mobile Phones 
The logic which underpins NFC payments is that the 
cardholder must present their card to the POS terminal to 
authorize the payment, this is enforced by the practical NFC 
read range being approximately 4 cm to 10 cm. However, our 
                                                                
1 Our experiments have been conducted using Visa credit and 
debit cards issued by Barclays Bank UK, this does not imply 
that the issue is limited to Barclays issued cards, it is probable 
that all NFC enabled Visa cards will implement similar 
functionality 
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work shows that a Visa fDDA2 transaction (see Figure 3 for 
details) can be successfully relayed to a payment card at a 
remote location using two mobile phones, with the card 
returning a successful transaction authorization. This negates 
the assumption that the card was present when the transaction 
was performed and thereby negates the “proximity” element 
to the security argument for NFC payments. In this paper we 
present the relay as a means of accessing the Verify PIN 
functionality on an NFC payment card whilst the cardholder 
is performing a legitimate NFC transaction. 
The operation of NFC enabled Visa cards are controlled by the 
Visa EMV specification [9], on which this research is based. This 
implies that many of the cards implemented to this specification 
will be prone to the vulnerabilities we have identified so far. 
In this paper, we present a number of viable attacks on NFC card 
payments using a combination of NFC data skimming, NFC 
Verify PIN and NFC transaction relay functionality. There are 
several goals within the attacks we have proposed: (i) collecting 
the card details for “card not present” fraud, (ii) probing the card 
for its PIN number for ATM withdrawals, and (iii) maliciously 
locking the card. This is all done wirelessly so the cardholder is 
unaware that their card has been accessed. Moreover, the paper 
explains the anomalies that we have identified in the EMV 
contactless specifications. The paper also describes the concrete 
implementations we have carried out to prove that it is viable to 
exploit the anomalies. From these implementations, we put 
forward viable attack scenarios, and finally we discuss the 
implications of and possible solutions for these anomalies. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Our previous research into the EMV contactless card payments 
includes an illustration of a skimming attack on NFC payment 
card [16], which gathered the card’s details (including the card’s 
CVV from the back of the card), and the use of an Android mobile 
phone to skim the card data whilst still in the victims’ wallet [30]. 
The use of mobile phones as a method of skimming data from 
NFC card payments has also been documented by RHUL [17] and 
by a report on the UK Channel4 News [25]. The Verify PIN 
attack we explore in this paper could easily be incorporated to a 
skimming attack based on a mobile phone platform or on a hidden 
NFC reader attached to a PC. 
Cambridge University researchers have found – through an online 
survey – that some PIN numbers are much more likely than others 
[2]. This could increase the likelihood of guessing the correct 4-
digit PIN from 1 in 5000 to 1 in 100. This research is backed up 
by a recent newspaper report [34] of a burglar in the UK who 
successfully took out money from two stolen cards by guessing 
the PIN of the cards using the birthday information on the driving 
licence found in the same stolen wallet. This poses the possibility 
of enhancing the attack in the future by taking the birthday 
information from an NFC enabled ID card or drivers licence, 
which may also be present in the wallet being scanned. 
Royal Holloway University London (RHUL) have carried out 
NFC relay experiments using mobile phones which relay multiple 
protocols including card payment transactions [18][20]. 
Tel Aviv University have published experimental work which 
shows that the range of NFC can be extended to 25 cm [23]. This 
                                                                
2 Visa fast Dynamic Data Authentication (fDDA) transactions use 
a new protocol sequence which significantly speeds up the 
processing of Visa NFC transactions [9]. 
raises the possibility of the Verify PIN attack being deployed in a 
scenario where victims are simply passing through a doorway or 
turnstile with their wallet in their pocket. Note that the technical 
challenges involved are significant. 
3. BUILDING BLOCKS 
Our approach has been to read the EMV specifications for both 
the original Chip & PIN transactions and the new NFC contactless 
transactions meticulously, and to produce a software emulation of 
a POS terminal which precisely implements the functionality as 
per the EMV specifications. 
From this core understanding of the EMV Chip & PIN and EMV 
NFC operational functionality, we have designed a number of 
implementations to validate our understanding that the 
specification meets the operation of genuine cards and POS 
terminals. We then proceeded to investigate any anomalies we 
have observed in the concrete implementations of the 
functionality of the specification through testing our theories 
against real payment cards. Finally, we used our implementations 
to test the cards in unusual modes of operation outside the 
specification. 
The research presented in this paper focuses on the security 
impact of adding the NFC payment application to existing Chip & 
PIN cards. Our implementation work has highlighted the 
following anomalies in the operation of NFC enabled payment 
cards issued by Visa in the UK: 
3.1 PIN Verification Using the NFC Interface 
Our experiments show that Barclay Visa NFC cards will support 
the enciphered Verify PIN functionality on the NFC interface. 
This functionality enables the attack scenarios we outline later. 
Although the Verify PIN functionality is listed in the Visa NFC 
specification [9], this function is not used in the protocol sequence 
of the NFC transaction. Authorization is performed by simply 
placing the card on the reader, i.e. there is no PIN entry required. 
Our assertion that Verify PIN is a redundant functionality is 
supported by experiments on NFC enabled MasterCard cards, 
which do not support Verify PIN over NFC. Moreover, the 
MasterCard NFC specification [24] specifically states that 
“Offline Personal Identification Number (PIN) is not supported 
for performance, usability, and security reasons.” 
We looked in the specifications for valid reasons for the 
functionality to be included, one thought was that it may be to 
support future mobile phone NFC transactions. However, both 
Visa and MasterCard have included logic for future support 
“consumer devices” into their respective versions of the EMV 
contactless specification [8][9], which state that any PIN entry 
will be performed on the consumer device. 
3.2 NFC Transaction Relay using Mobile 
Phones 
Our implementation work proves that it is possible to successfully 
relay Visa fDDA transactions using two NFC enabled mobile 
phones. We need a relay because we cannot implement this 
functionality on one NFC device; we need one phone to 
communicate with the card and another to communicate with the 
POS terminal, this is due to the physical operation of NFC 
transmission. The implementation used our University’s WiFi 
network to transfer commands between the two mobile phones, 
this allowed us to relay transactions to a credit card located in 
another room. 
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The relay technology we have developed can be used as a 
platform for “man-in-the-middle” attacks [1] on NFC cards where 
extra commands are inserted into the protocol sequence during the 
relay process. The EMV protocol was proven vulnerable to the 
“man-in-the-middle” attack, which changed the protocol sequence 
to allow transactions to be authorized using an incorrect PIN [26]. 
The ability to relay transactions takes away one of the 
fundamental security features of NFC transactions, in that to 
authorize the payment the cardholder must present the card to the 
POS terminal (the card has to be placed within 4 cm to 10 cm of 
the POS terminal). Without this key assumption being true, it 
follows that it cannot be asserted that the cardholder consented to 
the transaction. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION WORK 
We now present the details of our implementation, from which we 
can construct attack scenarios described later in Section 5. 
4.1 Implementation 1 – NFC Card Data 
Skimming  
Our previous work includes skimming the data from payment 
cards with implementations on Android mobile phones and on the 
PC platform using USB NFC readers [16]. 
In these implementations, the data skimmed from the card are the 
cardholder’s name, the card number (PAN), the expiry date, and 
the start date. A recent news article by Channel4 [25] proves that 
this data is enough to make fraudulent purchases from some 
online retailers. The average time to skim all of the data from an 
NFC payment card is 281 ms (we ran the skimming protocol 
sequence five times on the same NFC Visa card; the time to 
execute each sequence was very consistent with a standard 
deviation of 46 ms). 
Skimmed data from the card can then be used in an attack on its 
own as discussed above, or it cab result in a much more damaging 
attack when the skimmed data is incorporated into one of the 
more sophisticated attack scenarios described in Section 5. 
4.2 Implementation 2 – NFC Verify PIN 
This experiment shows that NFC enabled Visa credit and debit 
cards issued by Barclays Bank UK will perform the Verify PIN 
command over the NFC interface – which as NFC transactions do 
not require PIN entry – is a redundant functionality that can 
potentially compromise the security of the protocol. 
The Visa fDDA transaction protocol used for this experiment is 
illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the typical sequence of 
commands being executed for the protocol. These commands 
include those for opening communication with the card, asking 
the card to list available applications, selecting the card 
application, reading the number of remaining PIN attempts, and 
performing the Verify PIN command. In particular, we need to 
check the number of PIN attempts remaining before executing the 
Verify PIN command. Typically, three PIN attempts are allowed, 
so for our attack, we can perform Verify PIN twice, leaving at 
least one remaining PIN attempt to avoid locking the cards. This 
is to avoid alerting the cardholder that he has been attacked. 
The average time to execute the whole sequence was 681 ms. If 
an attacker were to implement an attack such as the one described 
in Section 5.1, it would be easy to hide this extra time in a 
standard NFC transaction which can take up to 5 seconds 
depending on the make and model of the POS terminal. 
Interestingly, although the contact Chip & PIN interface of the 
Barclays Visa cards support Verify PIN using both a plaintext PIN 
and enciphered PIN, the NFC interface only supports enciphered 
PIN. Not allowing plaintext PIN to be transmitted over NFC is 
logical, as a plaintext PIN could easily be captured using the NFC 
eavesdropping [22] capabilities of products such as the 
ProxMark3 [28]. However, this raises a question on why would 
Visa deliberately remove plaintext PIN from their NFC cards, but 
not completely remove the redundant Verify PIN command from 
the NFC interface altogether. 
 
Figure 1. Visa fDDA Transaction Protocol 
4.2.1 Denial of Service Attack using NFC 
Our implementation of a Verify PIN attack uses the protocol 
sequence shown in Figure 1, which includes two enciphered PIN 
attempts in a loop. To implement an attack which denies the use 
of the card to the cardholder, we simply need to include a third 
(incorrect) PIN attempt to the sequence, which will result in the 
card being locked. The average time taken for two PIN attempts is 
680 ms. With three PIN attempts, approximately 870 ms is needed 
to execute the card locking sequence. 
The Verify PIN attack has been tested on the Android Galaxy 
Nexus mobile phone which can read an NFC card, whilst the card 
is inside a wallet in a trouser pocket [30]. Given that it is possible 
to block the victim’s card in their pocket with a commercially 
available mobile phone, it is easy to see that this is the kind of 
attack that could be implemented as a malicious prank, aimed a 
annoyance rather than commercial gain. Nonetheless, it might be 
possible for malicious attackers to hold a bank ransom by 
threatening to upset their customers by locking their NFC cards. 
4.3 Implementation 3 – Relaying a Visa 
fDDA Transaction using Mobile Phones 
The process of authorizing an NFC transaction involves the 
cardholder presenting their card within approximately 4 cm to 10 
cm of the POS terminal and holding it there until the POS 
indicates that authorization has been competed. In this 
experiment, we relay a Visa fDDA transaction to an NFC card at a 
remote location with one mobile phone being placed on the card 
as a proxy reader and the other mobile phone being placed on the 
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POS terminal as a proxy card. However, the ability to relay a 
transaction to a card at a remote location and have the card return 
a valid authorization code negates the assumption that the 
cardholder has authorized the transaction. 
The relay attack circumvents the functionality within EMV – 
Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) – designed to ensure 
fraudulent transactions cannot take place if the genuine card is not 
present. This is because the relay attack uses the genuine card to 
authorize the transaction in real-time. 
 
Figure 2. NFC Transaction Relay Using Mobile Phones 
Our experiments – along with research carried out at RHUL 
[18][20] – prove that it is possible to successfully relay NFC 
payments using off-the-shelf equipment, in this case two NFC 
enabled mobile phones. As depicted in Figure 2, the Blackberry 
Bold 9900 phone on the right acts as a proxy card, receiving 
commands from the POS terminal and relaying them to the 
Android Nexus S phone on the left. The Android phone – acting 
as a proxy reader – then passes these commands to the NFC card. 
In turn, the responses of the NFC card are passed back to the POS 
terminal through these two phones. 
The protocol sequence being relayed in this experiment is the Visa 
fDDA transaction specified in [9], and detailed in Figure 3. The 
transaction sequence shown in Figure 3 is initiated by the POS, 
which specifies the amount, date and currency code of the 
transaction. The POS terminal waits for a card to be present, and 
then asks the card to list available applications. The terminal then 
selects the Visa card application, invoking the Get Processing 
Options command to pass the details of the transaction to the card, 
upon which the card returns the signed transaction along with the 
application cryptogram which signifies that the transaction has 
been authorized by the card. The POS terminal finally reads the 
records containing the RSA keys required to check the signed data 
to complete the transaction. In our experiments, the whole 
sequence takes 530 ms to execute when the card is directly on the 
terminal and 1,640 ms to execute when relayed. 
 
Figure 3. Visa fDDA Protocol Sequence 
It can be argued that NFC relay attacks are unlikely as NFC 
transactions do not require a PIN, so it is much easier just to steal 
the card. However, this ignores the real threat of the relay attack, 
which lies in the ability to use it as an enabling platform for other 
forms of attack. The relay hides the attack by incorporating it into 
a legitimate transaction. In Section 5 of this paper, we present an 
example of how the relay can be used to hide the skimming of the 
card’s data, as well as to perform two Verify PIN commands. 
Research shows that a relay can be used as the platform for a 
“man-in-the-middle” attack on EMV transactions [26][3]. As 
transactions pass through the relay, the “man-in-the-middle” can 
both record and alter the data, commands or sequence of the 
protocol being passed between the POS terminal and the card. 
Although “man-in-the-middle” attacks are limited, due to EMV 
cards signing the transaction data to prevent it being altered, the 
control data such as Cardholder Verification Methods (CVMs) are 
plaintext and can be modified in flight to alter the behavior of the 
transaction. 
4.3.1 Delay Added by the Relay 
It is inevitable that a relay will add delays into the protocol 
sequence. Figure 4 shows the comparative timings for NFC Visa 
fDDA transaction with the card directly placed on the reader (in 
blue), compared to the same transaction relayed (in red).  Figure 4 
also provides details of the average time taken for each command 
in the sequence, which from left to right follows the sequence 
described in Figure 3. The timings are taken from the first byte 
transmitted by the reader to the last byte returned by the card. 
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Figure 4. NFC Transaction Command Execution Times3 
The average total transaction times are 530 ms for the NFC 
transactions, compared to an average of 1,640 ms for relayed 
transactions (the relay transaction sequence was executed five 
times and the standard deviation was 270 ms). Our experiments 
found that each command in the sequence had an underlying 
execution time, for example Get Processing Options demands the 
most processing from the card and therefore takes significantly 
longer than any other command. The additional network lag 
evident in the relay results reflects the amount of data returned by 
each command. Again, it is the Get Processing Options command 
that returns the most data and therefore has the greatest network 
lag. 
 
Figure 5. Verify PIN Command Execution Times3 
In addition to the time taken for the transaction relay, there is also 
the time required to perform the two PIN attempts. Figure 5 shows 
the time taken for each command in the sequence described in 
Figure 1. These commands are: list available card applications, 
select the Visa card application, read the number of remaining 
PIN attempts, call Get Challenge for data to encipher the PIN, 
perform Verify PIN command, call Get Challenge for a new 
unpredictable number, and perform Verify PIN command. 
The average time taken for two PIN attempts (assuming the first 
attempt is a failure) is 681 ms (we ran the execution sequence five 
times, the standard deviation was 122 ms). Adding that to the 
                                                                
3 The command-response timings are taken from the first byte of 
the command being sent to the last byte of the card’s response 
being received. 
relayed transaction time of 1,640 ms gives an average total time 
for that attack of 2,320 ms, which is almost five times longer than 
the 530 ms taken for the standard Visa fDDA transaction. 
However, this is still well within the 4-5 seconds typically 
experienced at a normal NFC POS terminal. 
4.3.2 Multi-Protocol Support 
In the current implementation, the relay software does not 
interpret the protocol commands being passed to and fro. This 
means that the relay is not restricted to the EMV protocol and 
could be used on many different NFC smart card applications (e.g. 
Oyster cards). This is also the case for the relay experiments 
implemented by RHUL [18][20]. 
Figure 6. Chip & PIN Transaction Protocol 
4.4 Implementation 4 – Ad-hoc Access to 
Verify PIN Command 
As a control experiment, we ran the Verify PIN script used in 
Implementation 1 on a number of current UK issued non-NFC 
payment cards. All of the cards tested in this experiment were 
currently valid credit or debit cards issued by UK banks, and 
included both Visa and MasterCard branded cards. It was 
observed that all of the cards tested prevented access to the Verify 
PIN command, returning “command not supported” message. 
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The experiment was expanded to execute Verify PIN as part of 
the Chip & PIN transaction protocol sequence. Figure 6 shows 
that it is the correct (or intended) usage of this protocol [14]. Each 
of the cards tested successfully performed the Verify PIN 
command when it was part of the appropriate command sequence. 
These results show that EMV payment cards are stateful and are 
aware of the correct sequence of commands. 
Our experiments indicate that it is the Get Processing Options 
command which initiates the transaction [14] and changes the 
state of the card, which in turn activates commands such as Verify 
PIN, Get Challenge and Generate AC which are all used to ensure 
that the card and the cardholder are genuine before the transaction 
is authorized. 
Our experiment also shows that ad-hoc access to the Verify PIN 
and Get Challenge commands is allowed on Barclays Visa NFC 
cards but not allowed by Visa cards without NFC and not allowed 
by MasterCard both with and without NFC. In particular, the 
experiment found that only Barclays Visa NFC cards would 
perform Verify PIN and Get Challenge commands out of 
sequence. 
These findings indicate that Visa NFC cards have relaxed some of 
the security features in existing Chip & PIN cards that prevent 
access to secure functionality of the card.  
5. ATTACK SCENARIOS 
In this paper, we present attack scenarios that take advantage of 
the NFC data skimming functionality, NFC Verify PIN 
functionality, and NFC relay functionality described above. The 
objectives of these scenarios are (i) to skim the data from the card, 
(ii) to obtain the card’s PIN number, (iii) to hide the attack from 
the victim by hiding it in a real transaction, and (iv) to maliciously 
lock the card. 
5.1 Scenario 1 – Pay & Display Attack 
The scenario we present is an NFC enabled “Pay & Display” 
parking machine serving a large car park. This attack scenario 
depends on a high volume of people with NFC enabled credit and 
debit cards visiting an unfamiliar location, which is exactly the 
type of situation that will occur in London at the 2012 Olympic 
Games. The situation is compounded by the marketing push for 
the introduction of many new NFC cards, NFC mobile phones and 
NFC POS terminals centered on the Olympics, which could mean 
that there will be a lot of cardholders and merchants who will be 
unfamiliar with the correct operation of NFC. 
In order to attack an NFC payment card, the card must pass within 
4 cm to 10 cm of a malicious NFC reader and remain in range for 
a few seconds. The easiest way to achieve this for large numbers 
of cards, without the cardholders becoming suspicious, is to 
incorporate the PIN attempts into a situation where the cardholder 
is presenting the card for a legitimate transaction, such as paying 
for car park fee. 
5.1.1 Situation 
We have highlighted “Pay & Display” parking meters as a 
potential attack scenario for the following reasons: (i) a large busy 
car park will produce the volume of NFC card reads, (ii) the 
machine is unattended, which allows the criminals to attach the 
malicious NFC relay to the parking machine, (iii) the false front 
required to hide the attack equipment would be similar to current 
cash machine skimmers, and (iv) NFC parking meters have been 
piloted in the UK [33]. 
5.1.2 Technology 
The attack consists of three elements: 
• a proxy reader (an Android Nexus S phone), which will 
communicate with the victim’s card, 
• a proxy card (a Blackberry 9900 phone), which will relay the 
commands from the parking machine to the Android phone, 
• a convincing false front for the parking meter, behind which 
the two NFC mobile phones will be mounted. 
 
Figure 7. Parking Machine Attack 
5.1.3 The Attack Sequence 
The sequence for the attack in Figure 7 would be as follows (the 
numbers in the list refer to the numbers in Figure 7): 
1. The sequence is triggered by the victim presenting their NFC 
enabled card to the parking machine. 
2. Behind the false front Android Nexus S detects the card and 
initiates the protocol. 
3. The Android phone will interrogate the card to find out how 
many PIN attempts are remaining. 
4. The Android phone will attempt to guess the PIN number of 
the card making as many guesses as it can without locking 
the card, the victim is left with one valid PIN attempt. 
5. If the PIN is guessed correctly (see Section 5.1.4) the 
Android phone will send an SMS to a nearby attacker to alert 
them that the person currently at the parking machine has a 
known PIN and should be followed to a convenient location 
to be mugged for their card (Section 5.1.5). 
6. The Android phone signals to the Blackberry 9900 that it is 
ready for the real transaction. 
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7. The Blackberry switches on NFC emulation and the parking 
machine’s POS terminal will initiate a transaction. 
8. The Blackberry relays commands from the POS terminal to 
the Android phone, which then passes them directly to the 
card. 
9. The Android phone relays the card’s responses to the 
Blackberry, which sends them to the POS terminal. 
10. When the transaction is complete the parking machine will 
produce the ticket and the victim leaves unaware that 
anything abnormal has occurred. 
5.1.4 PIN Guessing 
Recent research by Cambridge University [2] based on a survey of 
real 4-digit PIN numbers in use on bank cards to plot a 
distribution of PIN numbers “in the wild” reveals two key facts 
that make Scenario 1 a viable attack. First, PIN numbers are much 
more predictable than 1 in 9999. The distribution showed that 
there is a list of the more popular PIN numbers, from which the 
Cambridge team calculated a 1.44% chance of guessing a correct 
PIN within three attempts when using their “most popular” list 
derived from the distribution, which equates to guessing the PIN 
correctly for one in every 69 cards. Second, the survey results 
show that 39.8% of respondents carried multiple cards in their 
wallet and of those, 34.3% used the same PIN on several cards. 
This works out at 13.69% of wallets yielding multiple cards with 
the same PIN. 
The Cambridge research only gives probability of guessing the 
correct PIN for three PIN attempts of 1.44% and six pin attempts 
of 1.94%. Our attack uses two PIN attempts, so we are estimating 
a success rate of 1.00% (1 in 100 cards). This would be more than 
enough to make the attack worthwhile. 
A recent court case [34] reinforces the Cambridge findings, as a 
burglar was able to correctly guess the PIN number of two stolen 
bank cards by trying the birth date from the driving license he had 
also found with the cards. 
5.1.5 Pay Off 
Once criminals have the victim’s PIN, they need the card to go 
with it. This would probably mean pick pocketing or mugging the 
victim at a location far enough away from the parking machine so 
as not to produce a crime cluster around the car park. If the victim 
has multiple cards, the Cambridge research [2] also shows that the 
same PIN should be attempted on the other cards as there is a 
good possibility that they will have the same PIN. 
For every PIN guessed correctly, there will be many cards which 
were read but not guessed correctly. Nonetheless, the criminals 
can still gain from these failed attempts. Our earlier experiments 
[16] show that it is easy to skim the details required for “Card Not 
Present” fraud from an NFC card. The 16-digit card number, the 
customer name and the card expiry date would be collected as a 
by-product of the PIN guessing and relay activities. “Card Not 
Present” fraud is the term given to over the telephone or online 
fraudulent transactions; it is responsible for 65% (£ 221 million) 
of UK card fraud losses in 2011 [31]. The value of this data was 
highlighted by a recent UK news report where NFC skimmed data 
was used to buy goods on the Amazon site where no CVV4 was 
                                                                
4 Card Verification Value (CVV) is a 3-digit code printed on the 
back of the card required in Card Not Present transactions to 
prove that the customer is in possession of the genuine card. 
required to authorize the transaction [25]. Therefore, this data can 
be either used to attempt to purchase goods directly or can be sold 
on as large list of credit card details. 
5.2 Scenario 2 – Lost in the Mail 
Consider a situation where a rogue mail employee uses an NFC 
enabled mobile phone to scan all of envelopes containing the 
credit and debit cards that pass through their hands. The rogue 
employee keeps the envelopes where the PIN is guessed correctly 
and lets the other cards continue on into the system to be delivered 
to the cardholder. The cards with correctly guessed PIN numbers 
can then be used to make ATM withdrawals. 
The rogue employee would probably be found relatively quickly 
if they were a local delivery person as their activity would 
produce a recognizable cluster of lost cards. However, we 
envisaged this attack taking place in a distribution center where 
there would probably be a better chance of avoiding detection, 
making the risks worthwhile. Note that there is no relay 
technology required for this attack, just the Verify PIN 
implementation on the NFC enabled mobile phone. 
5.3 Scenario 3 – Door Entry Systems 
People entering a building with an NFC door entry system usually 
hold their entire wallet up to the reader to gain access. The wallet 
contains the door entry card but may also contain one or more 
NFC payment cards. This is a dangerous attack scenario as people 
use the same door reader day after day, giving the attack many 
chances to guess the PIN; the person entering the building would 
be completely unaware that the NFC payment card had been 
accessed as it does not leave their wallet. 
Further consideration of this attack shows it to be technically 
difficult with currently available off-the-shelf NFC readers. 
Nonetheless, this may improve in the future with better readers 
and software. The technical challenges involved here are in 
distinguishing between and communicating with two or more 
cards, as well as dealing with the constraints that door entry 
systems operate much faster than NFC payments (typically less 
than a second), giving little time to add extra commands. 
6. DISCUSSION 
Why have Visa included the Verify PIN functionality on NFC?  
Our implementation work indicates that Visa have removed 
plaintext Verify PIN using NFC but included enciphered Verify 
PIN using NFC, even though NFC transactions do not require PIN 
entry. The Visa contactless specification [9] describes the Verify 
PIN function but does not include the command in the transaction 
protocol sequence. Therefore a question arises on why Visa have 
included an apparently redundant functionality which is a 
potential security risk. 
It does not appear that this is an oversight in the implementation 
as Visa have removed plaintext Verify PIN which could be picked 
up by an NFC eavesdropping device but left in the enciphered 
Verify PIN functionality which is safe from eavesdroppers. 
MasterCard seem to have taken a different view on the operation 
of their NFC cards, stating “Offline Personal Identification 
Number (PIN) is not supported for performance, usability, and 
security reasons” [24]. 
The obvious assumption is that Visa have a future use for the 
Verify PIN functionality, however we have not found any 
reference to it in the currently published documentation. 
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Our analysis of this issue leads to the conclusion that Verify PIN 
is a potentially dangerous redundant functionality which should be 
removed from Visa NFC cards. 
6.1 Discussion of the Verify PIN attack 
In the future, the PIN guessing attack could be improved in cases 
where the victim’s date of birth might be available from one of the 
other NFC cards in their wallet [34]. This does not have to be a 
driving license (which is likely to be protected with sufficient 
security measures); it could be an NFC library card, an NFC gym 
card or an NFC loyalty card. 
We have also considered the implications of the growing use of 
NFC cards for multiple different applications (such as door entry, 
transport systems, and library cards) and human factors which 
influence the way in which we use NFC cards. Our conclusion is 
that the most dangerous situations are those where people present 
their wallet full of NFC cards to a reader and let the reader decide 
which NFC card it wants to read. The individual is completely 
unaware of which cards have been accessed and what data has 
been read. 
Our experimental work [16] utilizes a PC platform with more 
powerful NFC readers than is available on the mobile phone. The 
more powerful readers give a faster, more reliable read of multiple 
cards within a wallet presented to the reader, which would 
facilitate the development of more complex attacks such as 
reading other cards to find a birthday and trying combinations of 
that for the PIN number. 
6.2 Discussion of the Relay Attack 
The implementation of a relay attack using the Android and 
Blackberry mobile phones produced a reliable attack platform for 
the Verify PIN attack and would be a suitable vehicle for man-in-
the-middle attacks. 
The relay is also a suitable vehicle for many other attack scenarios 
as it allows a genuine transaction to proceed, thereby reassuring 
the victim that nothing unusual has occurred. 
The protocol transfer delays introduced by the relay are 
significant – 1,640 ms for a relayed fDDA transaction as opposed 
to 530 ms for the same transaction without the relay. However, 
this should not be too much of an issue as (i) the relayed time is 
still well within the 4 to 5 seconds transaction time of an NFC 
transaction at a POS; (ii) to avoid or minimize rejected 
transactions, it is not in the interest of the EMV specification to 
enforce strict response times. 
Implementing stricter timing constraints and distance bounding 
[4][29] are methods via which the POS terminal could detect and 
possibly prevent the relay. However, a key element of the EMV 
protocols is the interoperability of POS terminals and cards from 
different manufactures and different countries, ensuring that 
transactions are successfully captured from the first attempt; 
implementing tighter restrictions would affect interoperability, 
possibly causing a lot of valid cards to be rejected. 
Research into the timing constraints enforced by Chip & PIN 
terminals [4] proves, from relay experiments carried out on live 
terminals, that POS will tolerate very high latencies. The research 
also suggests that the relay can make it appear as if the card is 
responding more quickly by sending certain commands in the 
protocol sequence before the POS requests them and pre-
recording the card’s responses. The unpredictable number in the 
Get Processing Options (GPO) prevents this command from being 
pre-sent and replayed, however in the Visa fDDA transaction, the 
card signs its response using RSA cryptography, which takes 
some time, so the POS terminal is expecting a lengthy delay, in 
our experiments 270 ms from the first byte of the GPO command 
being sent to the last byte of the card’s response being received. 
A relay attack could also take advantage of the ISO 14443 
protocol negotiation process, as described in [20], which allows 
the card to set the timeout value for its own responses. This would 
allow the Blackberry phone in the attacking relay to set the 
timeout to 5 seconds allowing plenty of time for the relay. 
A distance bounding protocol is a more sophisticated technique of 
protecting against relay attacks. It utilizes cryptographic 
challenge-response timings [21] to accurately measure the 
distance between the card and the reader. However, it is the 
additional sophistication of this technique, which would add a 
new protocol layer into EMV contactless transactions, that would 
make it too expensive to implement given the number of EMV 
cards and EMV POS terminals worldwide [35]. 
6.3 Discussion of Ad-hoc Access to Verify 
PIN Command 
Within the Visa specification of the new fDDA NFC payments 
protocol, there is an underlying requirement for speed, illustrated 
by the following excerpt taken from [9] “10.1 Card in Field - The 
primary requirement is the maximum time that a card must be 
present in the reader field when presented for a single 
presentment. This is a maximum of 500 ms (0.5 seconds)…” 
Table 1. Comparing EMV and fDDA Transaction Sequences 
EMV Offline Transaction 
Sequence [14 pp. 84]  
Visa fDDA Transaction 
Sequence [14 pp. 134]  
1 Card detected in POS 1 Card detected by POS 
2 Select card application 
Select() 
2 Select card application 
Select() 
3 Initiate Transaction 
Get Processing Options() 
3 Authorize Transaction 
Get Processing Options() 
4 Read the card data 
Read Record() 
4 Card authorizes 
transaction 
5 Check processing 
restrictions of card 
5 Read the card data 
Read Record() 
6 Customer enters PIN or 
signature to verify 
Get Challenge() 
Verify PIN() 
6 Card can be removed 
from the POS 
7 Pass the transaction 
details to card 
Generate AC() 
7 POS verifies the card’s 
authorization 
8 Card authorizes 
transaction 
8 Check processing 
restrictions of card 
9 POS verifies the card’s 
authorization 
  
 Card can be removed 
from the POS 
  
This focus on speed is driven by the need to successfully complete 
the transaction before the card is removed from the NFC field. In 
the Visa NFC fDDA transaction protocol, this has lead to a 
reversal of the normal EMV sequence, the table below gives a 
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comparison of the equivalent EMV offline DDA5 protocol 
sequence with the new Visa fDDA protocol sequence. 
In the comparison shown in Table 1 above, step 3 in the EMV 
Offline and Visa fDDA NFC transactions uses the Get Processing 
Options (GPO) command in slightly different ways. In the EMV 
transaction, this command signals to the card that a transaction is 
starting, whereas in the NFC transaction, it is used as the request 
to authorize the transaction. This change of functionality in the 
GPO command is a likely explanation for Visa NFC cards 
allowing ad-hoc access to the Verify PIN functionality, the other 
cards tested in our experiments only allowed Verify PIN to be 
called after the GPO command had been called. 
6.4 Potential Solutions 
In this section, we discuss potential solutions to the issues raised 
in this paper. This discussion is bounded by the understanding that 
any changes to EMV will have a large impact due to the large 
number of EMV payment cards and POS terminals deployed 
worldwide. Moreover, changes can affect a number of parties: 
card issuers (Visa, MasterCard, American Express and JCB), the 
issuing banks (Barclays, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland etc.) and 
the companies who manufacture the POS terminals.  
6.4.1 Solution(s) for Visa NFC Verify PIN 
The specification for Visa NFC transactions does not require the 
Verify PIN functionality on the card, therefore this issue could be 
resolved if Visa removes the Verify PIN functionality from the 
NFC interface. 
In this case, the changes would be restricted to the software on 
Visa NFC cards; the POS terminals and backend bank software 
would remain the same. The cost of the changes could be 
minimized especially if done when cards are replaced when they 
are due (e.g. approaching expiry date), rather than a complete 
reissue for every cardholders. 
6.4.2 Solutions(s) for NFC Card Details Skimming 
Criminals are focusing on “Card Not Present” fraud, which has 
grown from 23% of all card fraud losses in 2001 to 65% in 2011 
[31]. There are two security measures designed to prevent this 
kind of fraud. First, the usage of the CVV printed on the back of 
the card, which is mandatory for all online and telephone 
transactions. Second, there are optional schemes such as Verified 
by Visa, where the website asks for an additional preauthorized 
pass-code.  
Unfortunately, investigations carried out by a UK Channel4 News 
[25] revealed that one of the largest online retailers, Amazon, was 
not implementing the basic CVV check, thereby making the card 
details skimmed from NFC cards much more valuable. 
The same Channel4 News report suggested that the data on the 
NFC cards should be encrypted to protect it from criminal 
hackers. However this would not be practical for two reasons: (i) 
the RSA encryption used by EMV cards and POS terminals is 
publicly documented [13], so a malicious programmer could 
easily create the algorithms for encryption and decryption of 
EMV data, and (ii) this would require major changes to all of the 
                                                                
5 Dynamic Data Authentication is a method by which EMV 
offline transaction can be securely authenticated by the card 
using its Private Key and the POS can verify the authentication 
using the card’s Public Key. 
EMV cards and POS terminals around the world, which would be 
too expensive. 
A possible solution would be to make the PAN6 available on NFC 
different from the PAN printed on the front of the card and only 
valid for NFC transactions, thereby making NFC skimmed data 
worthless in “Card Not Present” transactions. Changing the NFC 
PAN to be different from the PAN printed on the front of the card 
would stop data skimmed from NFC cards being used in “Card 
Not Present” transactions. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented implementation work and 
research into attack scenarios, which together make a compelling 
case for attacks combining NFC data skimming, NFC Verify PIN 
and NFC transaction relay to be a profitable activity for criminals. 
In our implementation work, we have successfully built and tested 
mobile phone and PC applications which prove that the attacks 
scenarios described in this paper are technically viable.  
Our key findings suggests that it would seem prudent for Visa to 
remove the Verify PIN functionality from their NFC cards as it is 
not used for the correct operation of contactless transactions. 
In the broader context of electronic payment, the magnetic strip is 
the most vulnerable interface included on EMV credit and debit 
cards. Magnetic strip reader technology is cheap, simple to 
implement and attackers have achieved considerable experience 
and success in exploiting it. The process of phasing out the 
magnetic strip has recently moved forward with Visa and 
MasterCard announcing that they will switch from magnetic strip 
to Chip & PIN in The United States by 2015 [32]. After magnetic 
strip is removed, NFC will be the most obvious way to attack 
payment cards because of its wireless interface. Therefore 
resolving any security issues in NFC will be a high priority in the 
immediate future. 
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